ABSTRACT With the development of mobile devices, mobile crowdsourcing has become the research hotspot in mobile crowd sensing networks (MCSS). How to protect the location privacy of mobile user in location-based services is a key problem in MCSS. However, with the increase of privacy-preserving level, the service quality will be influenced and decrease. In order to prevent mobile user's location privacy from being leaked, this paper proposes a location privacy-preserving mechanism CKD through combining k-anonymity and differential privacy-preserving. In addition, the tradeoff between privacy protection and service quality is solved based on Stackelberg game. Through comparison experiments, the proposed location privacy-preserving CKD is verified. In addition, the tradeoff between privacy protection and service quality can be solved by our location privacy-preserving.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, mobile devices not only be used as communication tools, but also involve social, entertainment, work and so on. With the rapid development of smart phones and internet technology, more and more new spatiotemporal crowdsourcing applications have emerged [1] . Because of the spatiotemporal characteristics of the spatiotemporal crowdsourcing system, crowdsourcing workers need to continuously apply LBS in order to collect sensing data (e.g., nearby maps information) [2] . However, the location information will be leaked if the mobile crowdsourcing system does not take any location-preserving mechanism. In addition, realtime property of mobile crowdsourcing systems makes the MCSS be more complex [3] . According to the crowdsourced data, attackers can accurately know the the user's real-time location, thus they tend to steal sensing data of users in order to obtain more profit [4] - [6] .
Therefore, how to establish effective location privacypreserving mechanism is an important research content in MCSS. Most of present location privacy-preserving mechanisms are researched based on pseudonym, false position and the method of exchange. However, if an attacker have a strong background knowledge, these approaches are not effective enough to resist the attacks of attackers who have the background knowledge. According to the location privacy-preserving, some researchers have proposed k-anonymous methods of Non-Clique Cloaking and Clique Cloaking according to the principle of k-anonymous in database protection [7] . However, most of k-anonymous methods of Non-Clique Cloaking failed to provide good service quality to users. In addition, the k-anonymous methods of Clique Cloaking cannot resist the continuous attacks [8] . In order to solve the tradeoff between privacy protection and service quality, some researchers have proposed corresponding solutions. Some location privacy-preserving mechanisms are proposed through cloaking or perturbing [9] . In addition, some researchers proposed the location privacy-preserving through adding noise to the real location in order to reduce the probability that one user exposes his real location [10] .
According to the above discussions, the effective location privacy-preserving mechanism should be researched in order to solve following problems: (1) most approaches are not effective enough to resist the attacks of attackers who have some background knowledge; (2) the tradeoff between privacy protection and service quality cannot be balanced effectively in most of privacy-preserving mechanisms. Therefore, according to the existing problems, this paper researches the location privacy-preserving mechanism through combining k-anonymous and differential privacy-preserving. In this paper, we are dedicated to increase the location privacy protection level of mobile crowdsourcing systems, meanwhile, we also need to guarantee service quality in order to provide good services for individuals. The contributions of this paper are shown as follows.
1) The location privacy-preserving is researched through combining k-anonymous and differential privacypreserving, which includes privacy-preserving for data collection and privacy-preserving for data aggregation. 2) We research the optimal strategy based on Stackelberg game in order to balance the tradeoff between privacy protection and service quality. 3) Analytical and empirical validations are done to show that the proposed mechanism achieves the anonymity and security objectives. We utilize dataset of mobility traces of taxis in Beijing to verify the effectiveness of the proposed location privacy-preserving. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the related works. Section 3 introduces the proposed location privacy-preserving mechanism. Section 4 illustrates the simulations, along with the parameter settings, followed by the result analysis and discussions. Finally, Section 5 concludes this paper.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we discuss the related works on location privacy-preserving methods. The k-anonymity was first proposed by Samarati and Sweeney [11] , [12] for protecting the privacy of relational databases. In order to eliminate the correlation between data attributes and user identities, the published data (e.g., census, medical) must contain no less than k records. On the basis of data privacy protection, k-anonymity is also widely used in location privacy. Many k-anonymity methods [13] , [14] aim to protect the identity of the user, requiring that the k users to send their locations and query to the anonymizer, which aggregates the k query contents in an anonymous snapshot. Therefore, the attacker only knows these k queries in one snapshot, but he cannot match users' identities with the queries. On the other hand, k-anonymity is also used to protect user's location, i.e., one user's real location is indistinguishable through hiding the k users' locations within an anonymous area. Dummy location [15] , [16] is a typical application of k-anonymity. It generates k − 1 dummy locations which are submitted to the service provider with the real location together. According to the applications of k-anonymity, cloaking [17] , [18] , [19] is also an important location privacy-preserving method. It will generate a cloaking region to hide k users' real locations. However, k-anonymity methods have following drawbacks: if the attacker has a strong background knowledge about users, k-anonymity cannot satisfy users' privacy requirements. For example, dummy locations are reliable if they look very similar to real locations. However, if an attacker has some background knowledge, the real location has a certain probability to be connected to the user. In addition, the cloaking region or the dummy locations will increase the load of LBS, because the additional dummy locations or points must be processed in k-anonymity.
In addition, k-anonymity failed to define attack model, which cannot quantize the knowledge that attackers owned. As a result, another privacy protection method, differential privacy, has been growing in popularity in recent years. Differential privacy was also originally proposed by [20] , and it was used for protecting individual's data while publishing aggregate data about the databases. Differential privacy has a strong privacy guarantee, which does not depend on the attacker's background knowledge in any way. Therefore, it has been widely researched and applied in privacy protection for data release [21] , [22] and privacy protection for data mining [23] , [24] , [25] . Obviously, differential privacy is more suitable for the protection of the aggregation information of multiple users, which is not appropriate for one's location privacy protection.
According to the location privacy protection, To Andrés et al. [26] proposed a regional geo-indistinguishability model based on differential privacy. The small changes about user's location will have little effect on the query results. However, if the user's location changes greatly, the query results will also change greatly. Therefore, The level of privacy protection can be set according to the changes of user's location. Geo-Indistinguishability mechanism denotes that, as the distance between real location l 1 and l 2 gets closer, that means l 1 and l 2 are indistinguishable. On the contrary, if the distance between l 1 and l 2 is big enough, it can be distinguished by the attacker easily.
According to the problems of existing location privacypreserving methods, we research the location privacypreserving mechanism through combining k-anonymity and differential privacy-preserving. In addition, we also solve the tradeoff between privacy protection and service quality based on game theory in this paper.
III. THE PROPOSED PRIVACY-PRESERVING MECHANISMS
In recent years, k-anonymity has been widely used in location privacy-preserving mechanisms. k-anonymity not only can protect users' location, but also can protect user's identities. The anonymous server places k users in a cloaking region that includes k points sharing the same point of interest. Therefore, attackers cannot distinguish the accurate location and identity of one user [27] . The definition of k-anonymity is shown as follows.
Definition 1 (k-Anonymity): A data set satisfies k-anonymity property if the information for each record contained in the data set cannot be distinguished from at least k − 1 records whose information also appear in the data set. VOLUME 6, 2018 However, k-anonymity location privacy-preserving mechanism based on cloaking regions are not sufficient to satisfy user's location privacy-preserving or service quality requirements. Hilbert cloaking and clique cloaking are the typical methods of k-anonymity location privacy-preserving methods. According to Hilbert Cloaking privacy-preserving, users cannot get enough service quality, in spite of it follows the principle of reciprocity, and provides good privacypreserving levels for users. Instead, Clique Cloaking can provide users the best service quality (it submits real position to LBS), but it does not satisfy the principle of reciprocity, i.e., it cannot prevent attackers from continuously attacking [28] .
Differential privacy is a notion of privacy from the statistical databases, to protect the security of aggregated queries in data base. Differential privacy have formed the following goals: the attacker can get the personal data of an individual participates in the database, then the attacker also get the similar result even when the individual does not participate. More formally, differential privacy requires that, given two databases D 1 and D 2 differ in only one element, the output distribution of the algorithm on these two data databases should be very close. This concept can be applied to any set of secrets L equipped with a metric d l . The distance d l (l 1 , l 2 ) expresses the distinguish level between l 1 and l 2 , if the distance is closer, that means l 1 and l 2 are indistinguishable. On the contrary, if the value of d l (l 1 , l 2 ) is big, it can be distinguished by attackers easily.
The set L indicates the user's possible locations, and
In addition, let L be the set of reported values, and ρ(L ) denotes the set of probability measures over L . The similarity between probability distributions can be measured by the multiplicative distance d ρ on ρ(L ), which is defined
The generalized variant of differential privacy under the metric d l , called d l -differential privacy, which is defined as follows.
A privacy parameter can also be introduced by scaling the metric d l .
If a user requests a service from LBS application, he will expose his geographical location information [29] . When a user wants to protect his location, the random noise is added into his real location l in location perturbation technology, and the perturbed position l will be submitted to the LBS server. Intuitively, location perturbation technology based on differential privacy can offer strong privacy protection. If two users' location coordinates satisfy d l -differential privacy, it can be claimed that these two location coordinates are indistinguishable. However, in some special cases, if user i events on a daily life routine, the attacker still can figure out user i' location with a large probability based on the probability distribution of the noise, the parameter settings of the system, and the personal background knowledge.
Therefore, this paper researches the location privacypreserving mechanism through combining k-anonymous and differential privacy-preserving. Although Clique Cloaking is insufficient and undesirable to resist continuous attacks, this approach is exactly complementary to the geoindistingguishable [30] . Through combining the advantages of k-anonymous and differential privacy-preserving, the proposed location privacy-preserving mechanism can effectively reduce the probability that attackers infer the real locations.
A. PRIVACY-PRESERVING MECHANISM FOR DATA COLLECTION
One mobile crowdsourcing task involves task assignment, privacy protection and data processing [31] . Our main objective is to protect the locations and identities of workers when they perform sensing tasks and communicate with platform [32] . In this section, we present the k-anonymous privacy-preserving mechanism that satisfies differential privacy. We will model the location coordinates based on the Euclidean plane, which is close to reality. Let U = (u 1 , u 2 , · · · , u i , · · · , u m ) be the worker set, and τ = t 1 , t 2 , · · · , t j , · · · , t n be the task set. Assume that worker u i accepts a micro-task to update the map data in a given area. Once u i enters the sensing data area and applies for LBS, his identity id i , true position p i , query time ta i and query content q i will be sent to mobile crowdsourcing platform. If platform directly utilizes differential privacy to protect his location privacy, i.e., adds noise to his real location l i , then reports l i to the LBS, although u i may not be on a daily life routine, the attacker can also obtain the task set τ from the platform because of background knowledge. As discussed above, the attacker still can confidently deduce the real location of u i . Therefore, mobile crowdsourcing platform searches for the nearest k − 1 users of u i firstly, and forms an anonymous snapshot which contains the information of k workers shown in Table 1 . It is important to note that the users' identities and the locations in Table 1 are disordered. Intuitively, the attacker has only 1/k probability to infer the real location of u i . However, if a worker continuously requests location service from LBS, the attacker can identify his real location and identity in Clique Cloaking privacy protection mechanism. Therefore, we need to add noise to the anonymous workers' location coordinates.
Let l 1 , l 2 , · · · , l k be the k workers' real locations, and l i is the real location of u i . According to any two workers' real locations l i = (x i , y i ) and l j = x j , y j , there exists a perturbed location l h = x h , y h that should satisfy P x h |x i ≤ e P x h |x j .
(1) P y h |y i ≤ e P y h |y j .
where ≥ 0, and h, i, j ∈ (1, · · · , k). In the proposed mechanism, we add the noise that obeys Laplace distribution, the probability density function is shown by
where µ is the mathematical expectation, and b indicates the scale parameter. This method has been proved that it satisfies 1/b differential privacy which is successfully used on database. However, according to location privacy, it cannot adapt the complex environment of MCSS. In this paper, d l -differential privacy is researched, which is suited for special attribute of location data. Therefore, (1) and (2) are improved by Laplace distribution, which are shown by
where b > 0. In addition, we utilize the following to generate the random noise:
where r nd is the random value in [− ]. In (6), b is set to be (maxx n − minx n ) / and (maxy n − miny n ) / respectively to generate x h and y h .
Because of triangle inequality, we can obtain |l j − l h | ≤ |l j − l i | + |l i − l h |, and following relations can be obtained:
According to (4) and (5), it can be transformed as
and for the x and y coordinates respectively, we can get We set b be the maximum distance for each point in the same k-anonymous set. Therefore, we can make sure that the probability of disclosure each location coordinate should always within a factor e of the probability if the k points are in the same anonymous set.
B. PRIVACY-PRESERVING MECHANISM FOR DATA AGGREGATION
If u i participates a sensing task and is required to upload photos of interest points in a given region. In the process of sensing data, u i 's location information is protected by the proposed privacy-preserving. After completing sensing task, u i will upload sensed photos to platform. However, we have assumed that the mobile crowdsourcing system is trustless in the above discussions. If the attacker attacks the mobile crowdsourcing system, he can obtain the sensed photos uploaded by u i . According to the shoot time and the content of photos, the attacker can deduce the real location of u i at that time. However, in the process of data transfer, we don't hope the attacker to distinguish where does the sensed data come from. Even if the attacker attacks the mobile crowdsourcing system, he also cannot tell that the sensed data comes from u i .
In this section, we discuss how to transfer the sensed data to solve the problem. In [33] , a linear data aggregation mechanism was proposed. This mechanism requires the mobile crowdsourcing system to randomly arrange transmission sequence for each user, each worker has his own parent node and child node(the first user only has child node and the last user only has parent node). The workers receive sensed data from parent node, and send sensed data to child node. This data aggregation protection mechanism takes into account the sudden condition, i.e., when certain node cannot continue to transmit data as a relay node, then the mobile crowdsourcing system informs and chooses failure node's child node as data receiver. However, this data aggregation mechanism is not efficient enough for large-scale sensed data. With the increase of users, the time for transmitting data increases linearly. In addition, workers must wait for the nodes pre-arrived to complete the task, which will waste a lot of time of workers. Thus, in order to solve this problem, we propose a dynamic data aggregation mechanism, which is shown as follows.
Step 1 Head node: When a worker u i completes his task, he must be the head node. He will notify the mobile crowdsourcing system that he needs to transfer the sensed data and the number of data copies he has collected. Let m i denote the sensed data, and m i = m l,t i , c|∀l ∈ ι, ∀t ∈ τ , where m l,t i is the content of the sensed data copies that u i collected in location l and time slot t, and c is number of data copies. The mobile crowdsourcing system randomly selects an anonymous snapshot AS that contains u i as a data transfer group, as well as selects a user who is still collecting data in AS as the u i 's child node. And the mobile crowdsourcing system needs set a threshold C which denotes the maximum value of the data copies that one worker can hold. Then the mobile crowdsourcing system informs u i to start data transmission, thus, u i begin transfers his m i to his child node. In addition, the mobile crowdsourcing system remove u m and u i from the sets U and AS respectively, where u m denotes the worker within the anonymous snapshot.
Step 2 Middle node: The child node u j receives m i from his parent node. When u j completes his task, he needs to notify the mobile crowdsourcing system, and the crowdsourcing system randomly selects a child node in set AS. However, u j should calculate the c ∈ m i after he adds his parent sensed data into the aggregative data set. And u j needs to send the the m i to his child node. At last, the mobile crowdsourcing system removes u j from set AS.
Step 3 Leaf node: When other workers complete their tasks, there is only one worker u k left in set AS. When u k completes his task, he also needs to notify the mobile crowdsourcing system. Then he should send the value c which is the sum of all parent node. And the mobile crowdsourcing system needs to make a judgment about the value c. If c ≥ C, the u k should send m i to the mobile crowdsourcing system. If not, u k should rejoin in the set of U and repeat from Step 1. In brief, the dynamic data aggregation mechanism can achieve the purpose of confusing the attacker by gathering a mount of sensed data in one place. Because of the spatiotemporal feature of mobile crowdsourcing system, such mechanism can also guarantee the security of location privacy. In addition, compared with the linear data aggregation mechanism in [33] , the proposed mechanism can improve the efficiency of data transmission, i.e., once a worker completes the task, the data can be transferred immediately without any waiting.
C. THE OPTIMAL STRATEGY FOR WORKERS
In the aforementioned description, d l -differential privacy mechanism can perturb worker's real location l and generate a reported location l . Therefore, the LBS response depends on the reported location instead of the real location, which leads to the answer of LBS maybe deviate the expected result of worker. The difference between real location and reported location can confuse the attacker and provide privacy protection for workers. However, the difference also brings the loss of service quality for workers. In order to resolve this tradeoff, we can regard this problem as an instance of a zero-sum Stackelberg game. The Stackelberg game is a strategic game in economics in which the leader firm moves first and then the follower firms move sequentially. A worker is seen as the leader, and he plays firstly by adding noise to his real location. The follower, i.e., the attacker, plays next by observing the reported location of worker and chooses his strategy to drawback worker's real location.
From the view of worker, let Q loss indicates the loss of service quality in an anonymous snapshot AS of k points, which is calculated by (7) .
where K represents the location perturbation mechanism, and K ll is the probability that real location l produces reported location l . And π can be viewed as the modelling of adversary's background knowledge which is produced by observing and analyzing the worker's daily behavior from LBS or other applications. d q (·) denotes the Euclidean distance between real location and reported location. Meanwhile, different tasks may require different location accuracy requirements. According to the types of tasks, mobile crowdsourcing system will set a maximum tolerable loss of service quality Q max loss caused by the added noise in real location, which satisfies (8) .
The influence of threshold Q max loss depends on the function d q (·), hence, in the case of d l -differential privacy mechanism, d q (·) is affected by the addition of noise, it means that the system can adjust it by parameter . The maximum distance between real location and reported location is closer, the Q loss is smaller.
From the view of attacker, he wants to infer worker's real location l based on the reported location l . According to the background knowledge π , the reported location l and the d l -differential privacy mechanism parameter settings from mobile crowdsourcing system, attacker estimates worker's real locationl. Besides, in our work, before mobile crowdsourcing system applies d l -differential privacy mechanism to guarantee worker's location privacy, the Clique Cloaking first protects worker's identity. Thus, the attacker needs to re-identify worker's identity before his inference attack.
Worker's location privacy is quantified in our mechanism, which can be denoted as the attacker's expected error through combining k-anonymous and differential privacy-preserving in an anonymous snapshot AS with k points.
where id is worker's real identity, and id is the worker's identity presumed by attacker. Re id denotes the re-identification attack metric in Clique Cloaking k-anonymous, which is obtained by
Note that if the presumed identify is same as the real identify, the value of d p l,l will not change, otherwise,
Firstly, mobile crowdsourcing system protects worker's privacy Privacy K , π, d p , Re id through combining kanonymous and differential privacy-preserving. Secondly, the attacker observes the reported location l and choosesl to minimize workers's privacy Privacy K , π, d p , Re id . Then, the attacker chooses an estimatel with probability h l l to minimize the value of
If there are multiple values ofl that satisfy (11) , the attacker will choosel with the probability h l l , which is positive only for minimizing the values ofl; for all other values of h l l are equal to 0. Hence, (9) can be revised from the view of attacker, which is shown by
Note that if only onel satisfies (12), the value is equal to 1, and others are 0. At last, we assume that the mobile crowdsourcing system knows the attacker's strategy. Therefore, the mobile crowdsourcing system will construct an optimal strategy through combining k-anonymous and differential privacy-preserving mechanism based on attacker's strategy:
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed privacy-preserving mechanism through utilizing the GPS trajectory dataset collected in Geolife project by 182 users in a period of over five years (from April 2007 to August 2012), and contains 17621 trajectories in Beijing, which is shown in Fig.1 . This dataset recoded a broad range of usersąŕ outdoor movements, including not only life routines like go home and go to work but also some entertainments and sports activities. Each trajectory is marked by a series of time-stamp GPS points that contain users' ids, timestamp (data and time), and users' locations (latitude and longitude). They are the eventbased simulations for our experiments.
In order to perform a simplify calculation in our experiments, the map of Beijing is divided into many square subregions that the side length is 0.1113 km. We adopt the flexible method to set up our simulation experimental environments, the details are shown as followings.
1) All the trajectories are distributed in different parts of Beijing, Fig.1 plots the distribution (heat map) of the dataset in Beijing. More than 90% of the trajectories distribute in a dense representation, which means that to April 2011 as the training data set to generate the attacker's background knowledge. For each user, we calculate the number of points that fall in each subregion, then we compute the probability that the user maybe appear in this subregion. And 30 subregions with highest probabilities are selected for each subregion shown in Fig.2 , different gray level represents different probability in each subregion. The higher the gray level, the greater the probability that the user will appear in the subregion. The user data trajectory from April 2011 to August 2012 is used as the experimental data. 3) As there is no user query in this dataset, we simulate the real conditions to generate the query for each point in the trajectories, and the contents of the query are replaced by Numbers whose range is [1, 20000] .
4) All experiments have been repeated more than 100 times and each measurement is averaged over 50 instances. We take the average of the multiple experiments as the final result.
A. COMPARISON EXPERIMENTS FOR PRIVACY
In order to demonstrate the efficiency of the proposed privacy-preserving mechanism, we compare the proposed privacy-preserving mechanism denoted as CKD in all figures, with the Clique Cloaking k-anonymous mechanism and the differential perturbation mechanism respectively. In the continuous query attack experiment, as shown in [34] , the value of k is set to be 3, 5 and 7 respectively. And the value of the continuity parameter σ is set to be 0.5 (σ indicates the probability that a worker sends the query with the same content as the previous query). In addition, we use timing to send query models which means the time interval between the two adjacent queries sent by the same worker is equal, and the query interval is set to be [0, 0.3]. In the attack experiment on differential perturbation, we first add noise to the real locations of workers in AS based on the proposed privacy-preserving mechanism. The random noise is generated by the inverse cumulative distribution r nd of the Laplace distribution, and b is set to be (maxx n − minx n ) / and (maxy n − miny n ) / respectively to generate x i and y i . Accordingly, the value of is set to be 0.53 and 1.02 respectively. After adding noise to the real location l, the reported location l is obtained. Then the boundary of the noise is calculated. According to attacker's background knowledge π , the probability k ll of generating random noise, the boundary and the reported location l to compute worker's most likely location. In order to compare the efficiencies of different algorithms better, we compute the IR which denotes the probability that attacker can identify the real sender or the real subregion of workers successfully by adopting attack algorithm. Fig.3 shows the experimental result when the is 0.53. From the experimental result, it can be seen that the CKD privacy-preserving mechanism has the best efficiency. In addition, with the increase of the value of k, the actual IR decreases in Clique Cloaking and CKD mechanisms, and there is no significant change in differential perturbation mechanism. However, with the increase of , as shown in Fig.4 , the is 1.02, the actual IR decreases significantly in differential perturbation and CKD mechanisms. Therefore, it can be seen that the result of CKD privacypreserving mechanism is affected by the value of k and clearly. However, the comparison experiments for IR cannot accurately reflect the privacy levels of workers. Therefore, we measure the privacy levels of workers by the expected error of attacker.
Given the Euclidean distance functions d p (·), d q (·) and the attacker background knowledge π , we compute the expected distance with service quality threshold Q max loss which is set to be 1 km and 2 km respectively, and compare the location privacy offered by CKD and differential perturbation. The expected error of attacker can be used to measure the privacy levels of workers more accurately.
From Fig.5 and Fig.6 , it can be seen that the results of CKD are better than the results of differential perturbation. We note that with the increase of service quality threshold Q max loss , the privacy levels of CDK and differential perturbation also increase. According to the above comparison experiments, it proves that the CKD mechanism performs better than the Clique Cloaking and differential perturbation privacy-preserving mechanisms on the aspect of privacy levels.
B. TRADEOFF BETWEEN PRIVACY AND SERVICE QUALITY LOSS
According to the tradeoff between privacy level and service quality loss, we also design the comparison experiments in this section. Fig.7 shows the comparison results on the tradeoff between privacy level and service quality loss according to a given user. From Fig.7 , we can see that the location privacy Privacy K , π, d p , Re id is less than service quality loss Q loss K , π, d q at the beginning, it is because that the calculation for the estimated locationl strongly depends on attacker's background knowledge. If Q max loss is small, the differential perturbation is small too. According to a given background knowledge π, the estimated locationl is close to worker's real location l. Because of the property of the differential perturbation, the values of k ll are very similar. With the increase of Q max loss , attacker's background knowledge π works poorly. Therefore, the location privacy Privacy K , π, d p , Re id is bigger than the service quality loss Q loss K , π, d q with the increase of Q max loss . The intersection in Fig.7 is Pareto Optimality, so that the privacy parameters will be set correspondingly in order to balance the tradeoff between privacy protection and service quality. In addition, Fig.8 Privacy arrives minimum, i.e., we obtain the best result.
V. CONCLUSION
With the development of mobile crowdsourcing systems, the location privacy protection has become the research focus. According to the location privacy-preserving, this paper researched location privacy-preserving CKD through combining k-anonymity and differential privacy-preserving. In addition, we utilized Stackelberg game to balance the tradeoff between privacy protection and service quality. Through compared with Clique Cloaking and differential perturbation, the performance of the proposed location privacy-preserving CKD was evaluated. The effectiveness of proposed CKD, and the adaptability of proposed optimal strategy were also verified through comparison experiments.
In future, we will focus on the social relationship between workers in order to further research the privacy-preserving mechanism.
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